

Does the perception of Casualties affect military operations in the 1990s?

**A Monograph
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ABSTRACT

Does the perception Casualties affect military operations in the 1990s? by Major Morris T. Goins, USA, 55 pages

This monograph analyzes three military operations Somalia, Haiti, and Kosovo in order to determine if and how casualties impact the commitment or withdrawal of US forces in the 1990s. These operations are viewed from the positions of the National Command Authorities, Congress, American public, media, and the military and the linkage to include the impact they had on each other.

The criteria are threat Casualty Analysis, impact of casualties on the will of the American public, and the impact of casualties on the NCA's decisions. This evidence was obtained from international newspapers. American newspapers also assisted with the analysis of what role the media plays in the process, along with the impact of the other forces that allow our military to commit, engage, and withdraw. Articles in newspapers such as the *New York Times*, *Los Angeles Times* and *The Washington Post* did shed light on the position of the NCA, US Congress, American people, media and the military. The congressional testimony of senior Army leaders along with books allowed the viewpoint of the military to surface to include guidance it received.

This monograph demonstrates that casualties did not impact the commitment or withdrawal during military operations in Somalia, Haiti, and Kosovo. In the case of Somalia and Haiti, the NCA was concerned with the perception of the president as making decisions of his own free will and not being forced by Congress into a course of action. The American public along with Congress wanted to ensure the military objectives were nested to national interest. In the case of Kosovo, ground forces were not committed because NATO did not support the commitment versus President William Clinton's willingness to commit ground forces. The Secretary of Defense and some members of Congress along with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not supportive of commitment of US ground forces.

The most important lesson about casualties in the 1990s is that the operational commander must advise the NCA that in order to successfully accomplish military missions, casualties have been and will continue to be a part of doing business. The operational commander must ensure force protection and understand that US casualties do not impact the will of the American public, but it does impact the NCA's perception of what the nation is willing to support or except. The number one priority of the operational commander is mission accomplishment and to never allow casualties to prevent them from achieving that objective.

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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

During the 1990s have the American public allowed the issue of casualties to influence its decision of supporting the National Command Authorities (NCA) whether to commit, or withdraw US forces?¹ This monograph determines if the above question is true by analyzing the commitment and withdrawal of US troops during the military operations of Somalia, Haiti, and Kosovo. During the Gulf War, January 16, 1991 through February 28, 1991, Americans supported the commitment of US forces, even with the expected casualties of about 20,000 during the ground war. The American public was polled on February 3, 1991 and asked "do you think the United States should stop its military action against Iraq if Iraq pulls its troops out of Kuwait, or only if Saddam Hussein is also removed from power?" Sixty-seven percent of those polled answered continue the war until Saddam is toppled.² There is currently a perception that the American public, Congress, and the National Command Authorities will not tolerate casualties. When the image of soldiers' remains were dragged through the streets of Somalia, it was believed that the Americans wanted to withdraw. The elected government officials were concerned about casualties because they thought it would portray a negative view of the administration and Congress if allowed to continue.³

The perception of the President, Congress and the media has been that the American public cannot stand casualties during military operations. Casualties affect any military operation and the operational commander/planner must

understand how and why. In the case of Somalia, Haiti, and Kosovo casualties did not directly affect these operations. If the mission is important enough to commit US forces, then the mission is important enough to successfully accomplish its original goals. The military must execute the orders of the NCA and while carrying out those orders, casualties are sustained. It is unfortunate however, force protection is important but mission accomplishment should be top priority. The recommendations from the operational commanders to the civilian leaders must be along those lines. The American public is not the problem, as this monograph will indicate.

This monograph investigates the issue of casualties by using books, newspapers, and polls. The military operations examined in this monograph have occurred within the past six years. Many of the government officials are still in public office, therefore there are few first hand sources about NCA meetings and the decisions made in these meetings. Although extensive research has been conducted on the contents and results of these meetings, the findings may not portray absolute truth.

There are two groups that effect the commitment and/or withdrawal of the US military. One group is the decision-makers, the National Command Authorities and the US Congress. The second group, which influences the decision-makers, includes the American public, the media, and the senior leaders of the military. This monograph examines how and why the decision-makers reach their decisions. The positions of the media, the American public and the senior

leaders of the military is described in order to determine what impact they had, if any, on the decision-makers.

Chapter II reviews the Somalia operation from the perspective of the decision-makers. This chapter examines why on October 6, 1993 just two days after the deaths of eighteen soldiers, the NCA reviewed the situation in Somalia and made the decision to withdraw. The US Congress was split on the issue of whether to withdraw or remain committed in Somalia. This chapter also explores the impact the American public, the media and the military's senior leaders had on the decision-makers.

Chapter III analyzes the military operation in Haiti from the perspective of the NCA and Congress, the decision-makers. The issue of Haiti from the NCA's viewpoint was how to stop thousands of refugees from entering the United States. Congress' position was there was no national interest at stake in Haiti. The position of the American public and the US military not to use military forces in Haiti is addressed. Nevertheless, President Clinton committed US forces into Haiti.

Chapter IV analyzes the current military operation in Kosovo. Once again, the decision-makers were split on the issue of committing US forces. President Clinton ordered the air operation, but said there was no intention to introduce ground troops without "a permissive environment." The US Congress was divided about what to do in Kosovo. The American public, the media and military were also divided on the issue of whether to commit or not to commit ground

forces. Nevertheless, US troops were committed to peacekeeping duties after the Yugoslavian government agreed to NATO's terms.

The era of automatically having congressional and the American public's approval to commit US forces no longer exists. Beginning in the 1990s and into the future the American public and members of Congress may not initially give their support to the Commander-in-Chief. It is believed the overarching reason for non-support of military operations is due to the number of casualties. This monograph proves casualties are not the major cause. The author begins with the Somalia operation by investigating casualties and their impact on military operations.

Chapter 2

Somalia

Initially the background of the commitment of US forces by President George Bush is examined followed by a timeline. This timeline covers the key events from the firefight to the President's decision to withdraw, which only spanned two days.

On November 25, 1992 President Bush, who recently had lost his bid for re-election, met with his senior National Security Council advisers. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell and others in DoD resisted commitment of US forces to Somalia without a clear mandate. General Powell's deputy attended this meeting and stated that if the US military is needed "we can do the job."⁴ President Bush chose the most forceful option, to offer that US troops lead a UN action. The US mission to the UN also argued that Somalia

provided the opportunity to increase UN credibility in peacekeeping in the post-cold war era, a policy advocated by President Bush as part of his "New World Order."⁵ The President did commit thousands of US soldiers, without congressional authorization, to assist in the Somalia humanitarian mission.

There were numerous problems in Somalia. One problem was the humanitarian mission, feeding thousands of Somali people. The Somali warlords were stealing the food from UN convoys, which restricted the humanitarian operation. In order to disarm the warlords, the Pakistani forces began to confiscate weapons. On June 5, 1993, armed Somalis ambushed and killed twenty-four Pakistani soldiers who were conducting a previously announced inspection of an arms depot that shared a compound with Mohamed Farah Aideed's radio station. Aideed was viewed as the leader and the most powerful warlord in Somalia. Simultaneously, other Pakistani soldiers were killed at a feeding center.⁶

The response from the UN Security Council was to adopt Resolution 837 that authorized using "all necessary measures against all those responsible."⁷ The resolution held Mohamed Farah Aideed responsible for the attack. UN Special Representative Jonathan Howe asked for additional US forces, including Delta force. The US Special Envoy Robert Gossiped sent an urgent cable calling for a shift in policy allowing for the apprehension of Aideed.⁸ The Secretary of Defense signed the deployment order and Task Force Ranger was on its way to Somalia.⁹

The Chronology October 3, 1993

The mission of this task force was to apprehend Aideed. This task force conducted six very successful raid operations in Somalia. During the seventh raid, things went wrong for the American force. Two Blackhawk helicopters were shot down resulting in one helicopter pilot captured, and initially six young Americans losing their lives. Late that evening, the military chain of command in Somalia began sending in progress reports to the Pentagon while the firefight raged. At this time there was no reaction from the American public or Congress. The firefight was not yet public knowledge since there was no first hand media coverage of the firefight in Somalia.¹⁰

As reported by George Stephanopoulos, in the President's private sitting room in the White House, President Clinton said in reference to the on-going firefight in Somalia, "we're not inflicting pain on these fuckers. When people kill us, they should be killed in greater numbers. I believe in killing people who try to hurt you, and I can't believe we're being pushed around by these two-bit pricks."¹¹ President Clinton believed public opinion would turn fast at the sight of body bags. He stated "Americans are basically isolationist, they understand at a basic gut level Henry Kissinger's vital-interest argument. Right now the average American doesn't see our interest threatened to the point of where we should sacrifice one American life."¹² As the firefight raged on, news reports began stating that American soldiers were being killed in Somalia.

October 4, 1993

After the battle CNN began broadcasting the videotape of the engagement to the US. The American people viewed the remains of soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. The final situation report reached the Pentagon with the casualty figures. The firefight in Somalia ended and eighteen American soldiers were dead and eighty-four wounded. In Somalia there were no military missions planned or executed for the following week until the location of the hostage was known and more US forces could be committed.¹³

These incidents occurred amid growing debate on Capitol Hill and elsewhere regarding how long US troops would remain in Somalia and what their mission should be. Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Sam Nunn, said "Congress should have a full debate on Somalia and endorse a purely humanitarian objective for US forces."¹⁴ Late that day Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and Secretary of State Warren Christopher briefed key congressional leaders in a contentious private session. They testified to Congress on why the US forces were engaged in combat. Upon the conclusion of this private session the Congress remained unsure if the military had enough forces to complete the mission successfully and if their goals were clear.¹⁵ Other key issues remained.

Some members of Congress felt that President Clinton had mismatched mandate and resources. Because of a fear of casualties and the perception that US interests was tenuous, there were members of Congress who were reluctant for the US to devote adequate force despite widespread support for the

humanitarian mission. Some Senators, including Robert C. Byrd and John McCain were quoted as saying, "Clinton's got to bring them home." Senator Byrd was prepared to offer an amendment to the defense-spending bill to cut off funding for the Somalia action. He was also urging a prompt vote by Congress on whether to continue the Somalia operation.¹⁶

Other members of Congress held a different position. Senators' Donald Payne and Sam Nunn reiterated that the US must not cut and run at the first signs of casualties. Senator Richard Lugar cautioned against a hasty withdrawal.¹⁷

When the American public saw the image of the captured bloody pilot on television, they demanded answers. This was to be risk-free, no casualties. How did we go from providing food to all out combat?¹⁸ Americans raised the issues to their congressional representatives with a "deluge of calls for immediate withdrawal of forty-five hundred US troops in Somalia."¹⁹

October 5, 1993

The media were reporting about the military hostage, and whether if the NCA was going to withdraw American forces from Somalia. They began conducting interviews with eyewitnesses. They rushed to the homes of the deceased soldiers and the hostage in an attempt to be the first to report news, which equates to higher ratings and higher profits. When the news of the firefight broke, the media adopted the theme of young Americans, helping feed a nation caught unexpectedly in combat. They also reported the numbers of casualties sustained.²⁰ Michael Getler, *The Washington Post's* assistant managing editor for

foreign news, felt the military was interfering with the American public's right to be informed.²¹ Andrew Kohut, the director of the Times Mirror Center for the People and the Press, held the position that the journalists were looking for the easiest way to stand out in the media world. Instead of factual reporting, some journalists for national publications and television networks were spicing up the stories with their own opinions.²²

General Colin Powell met with the National Command Authorities at the White House to review the situation in Somalia. General Powell did not initially support the commitment of US forces to Somalia.²³ At this meeting, he stated "because things get difficult, you don't cut and run. You work the problem and try to find a correct solution."²⁴

Congress was divided. Senator Robert C. Byrd urged a prompt vote by Congress on whether to continue the engagement in Somalia. He also recommended cutting funding for the Somalia mission. On the other hand Senator Richard G. Lugar, senior member of Senate Foreign Relations Committee, cautioned against this pressure for a hasty withdrawal. Finally, Congress delayed voting on immediate withdrawal from Somalia.²⁵

President Clinton met with top national security advisers to review policy options on Somalia following the contentious session on Capitol Hill. Prior to that meeting President Clinton had informed his National Security Adviser that "I want options on the table."²⁶ In attendance were President Clinton, Secretary of Defense Aspin, Secretary of State Christopher, General Powell and US Ambassador to the UN Madeleine K. Albright. They reviewed the options of the

US in Somalia, including whether to remain committed or withdraw from Somalia. Also discussed was the President's requirement to make a decision prior to Congress making a decision.

The President's advisers developed two courses of actions. One was to withdraw, because it was the easiest course of action. The other was to remain committed until the operation was completed correctly. It appears that General Powell made the recommendation to commit the additional troops required to conduct the additional required missions. Some of these missions were to protect bases, to open and secure roads, ports and lines of communications, and to apply pressure on those who cut off relief supplies.²⁷ President Clinton ordered 600 more troops and armor deployed to Somalia.²⁸

October 6, 1993

Since the media could not get into Somalia, they began the process of conducting interviews with the survivors. Their focus was on the hostage theme. Instead of one the media portrayed an undisclosed number taken captive. The media as a whole also felt the military should be providing for their welfare while reporting on the events in Somalia.²⁹

Major General Garrison's opinion was to remain committed in Somalia and pursue Aideed.³⁰ The seven military operations had been successful. The commander understood the importance of maintaining a strong image of the US military and UN in the eyes of the international community. He did not want to undermine this perception.

Another meeting with top national security advisers was held at the White House. If the President made the decision to withdraw immediately, the international community would learn the undesirable lesson that the way to defeat the US is to simply inflict casualties and then the US will automatically withdraw. Also, an immediate withdrawal would not support the UN's mission in Somalia. It would portray to the American public that the President only reacted to the situation, rather than taking the time to determine what was the US' best course of action in the situation. Alternatively, to delay the withdrawal for six months would satisfy Congress by ending the mission, and allowing the US to claim success while supporting the UN's mission. Most importantly, it would show President Clinton made the decision on his own terms, uninfluenced by pressure. President Clinton decided to build up forces until the withdrawal date of March 31, 1994, so he ordered 1,500 more troops sent to Somalia.³¹

The Congress was reported as being in a near panic. House Armed Services Committee Chairman Ronald V. Dellums called for the UN and the US to seek an immediate cease-fire including abandoning the hunt for Aideed. They also wanted to expand the effort to find a political solution among the various factions.³²

October 7, 1993

In the morning, senior congressional leaders were summoned to the White House. Before his speech to the American public, President Clinton informed representatives of Congress that he had made the decision to withdraw US forces from Somalia.³³ In a televised speech that evening from the Oval Office,

the President said, "we started this mission for the right reasons, and we're going to finish it in the right way."³⁴ In addition 3,600 Marines will be positioned offshore to "ensure that our people are safe and that we can do our job prior to withdrawal on March 31, 1994."³⁵

Analysis

The analysis of the Somalia operation examines the facts as best as can be determined, to establish if casualties were the main theme in the discussions.

The NCA was not concerned with casualties. The NCA was concerned with the image of the US in the eyes of the international community, and the appearance that the President was making the decisions on his own terms and not being forced into a course of action. Congress was prepared to force the President to withdraw or change the mission by withholding funds as impetus. The majority of Americans and the military wanted to remain committed to the operation. The media was focused on the casualties theme, not specifically on withdrawal.

President Clinton had to make a decision to withdraw or remain committed with the Somalia operation based on several factors. Personally, President Clinton wanted to remain committed in Somalia, as shown by his statements above. Another factor was that by not continuing the Somalia operation, the US would lose credibility with the UN and possibly the international community. President Clinton had attempted to maintain a positive image of the US throughout the international community, and at the time attempted to satisfy Congress. As was reported in *The Washington Post*, President Clinton was not

sure if Congress would accept the withdrawal date and he was prepared to move it closer.³⁶ In a contentious session to Congress, Secretary of Defense Aspin and Secretary of State Christopher testified in an attempt to convince the lawmakers that the additional 600 troops and armor was not an enlargement of the commitment to Somalia. Nevertheless, President Clinton made the decision to withdraw because he believed Congress would cut funding, ending the mission, and he needed the perception to be that he had made the decision on his own terms.³⁷

President Clinton stated that US forces would withdraw after the US completed the mission the correct way. This explains the withdrawal date of March 31, 1994. This withdrawal date demonstrated the President had made the decision on his terms. It also accounts for the reason the President ordered the build-up of forces in Somalia. In the span of a week President Clinton was due to brief Congress on his end state of the Somalia operation. In a rare defense of President Clinton predicament, William Safire, *New York Times* columnist said,

we, the media, hoot at the President for demeaning American power by entering the arena with such puny pugilists. We fault him for narrowly limiting the missions; for not foreseeing setbacks before we do; for making the American military look like a pitiful helpless giant; or for putting the flower of our youth needlessly "in harm's way".³⁸

President Clinton had only one practical decision, and that was to withdraw from Somalia. Stephanopoulos told President Clinton at the White House in late October 1993, "you did all you could, Congress would have forced a vote to end the mission now, and they would have won."³⁹ Should President Clinton have decided to do nothing and continue the Somalia operation, it was only a matter of

time before Congress cut the funding. President Clinton made the decision to remain committed for six months and to complete the mission, prior to the withdrawal.

Two Presidents, Bush and Clinton, had informed the Congress that US forces would engage in hostile action only as needed to accomplish their humanitarian mission and for the purpose of force protection consistent with the War Powers Act. As shown above, the Congress was split on the issue of remaining or withdrawing. Some members felt there was a mismatch of mission-to-force ratio. Others felt the US must not withdraw until the mission is successfully completed.

In mid 1992 the American public had supported President Bush's commitment of US troops to the humanitarian mission in Somalia. The Bush Administration had informed the American public, and subsequently the Clinton Administration that their soldiers were helping to feed a starving nation. Then the mission changed.⁴⁰ The mission was no longer simply to feed the Somali people. The new mission was to apprehend the Somalia warlord Aideed by the use of full-scale combat.

Some Americans supported a continuation or retaliation to the Somalia operation. A poll conducted after October 6, 1993, by the University of Maryland's Program on International Policy Attitudes, found that only twenty-eight percent of those surveyed favored immediate withdrawal. Forty-three percent of those polled wanted to remain in Somalia "until we have stabilized the country," even beyond the US' deadline for troop withdrawal.⁴¹ Some of the

Americans willing to continue the Somalia operation believed in the value of the humanitarian operation. Some Americans supported retaliation.

Between October 5th and 9th, 1993, both CNN/USA Today and ABC News polls found fifty-five to fifty-six percent of the respondents favored sending more troops into Somalia. Before the release of the US hostage held by the Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid, ABC found that seventy-five percent of those polls favored a "major military attack" against Aidid.⁴² The conclusion drawn from these polls is that casualties did not prevent the American public from supporting commitment of US forces.

While the poll data supported retaliation and continuation, the media seemed to send a different message. Kenneth T. Walsh a senior White House correspondent for *U.S. News & World Report* candidly reports how ordinary citizens are the biggest losers in current state affairs. Too often, he asserts, the press has four flaws: injecting too much attitude into stories, assuming an overly negative approach to all news, rushing to judgement, and ignoring the values of Middle America.⁴³ White House press secretary Dee Dee Myers conceded,

decision-makers no longer have any room to make a decision. Look at the amount of time prior Presidents had to attempt to resolve crises. I don't know how Presidents, secretaries of state, and other decision-makers that deal with crises are supposed to make decisions. Part of it is our fault.⁴⁴

John Byrd then an ombudsman for *The Washington Post* said, the middle-of-the-road reader, "the average citizens... simply don't trust us and feel that the media is out of touch with the rest of the country."⁴⁵ The media focused on the casualties and continued to report that they were the reason the NCA would

withdraw. The soldiers of Task Force Ranger that were still in Somalia "felt disgust that the press kept showing the horrible images of the dead soldiers being humiliated in the city, less than a mile away from where they sat."⁴⁶ They watched, along with the American public, as images of their dead comrades were put on display amid the jeering Somali crowds. The soldiers who filled the television room saw it replayed again and again and again. The media failed to report that during military operations, it is expected there will be casualties, caused either by accidents or hostile fire. Studies by foreign policy experts Eric Larson, James Burk, Steven Kull and I.M. Destler, reanalyzing polls taken during the crisis, demonstrated that even after the television reports, there was reservoir of public support for the operation.⁴⁷ Contrary to what the media portrayed, the administration believed forty-three percent of those polled wanted to remain committed to Somalia. Senior military leaders' position was also to remain committed to the operation.

Senior military leaders were concerned that the advice they offered to the NCA was not being heeded. The military's responsibility to the NCA is to advise on military matters, and provide military options. General Powell was concerned that US forces were being committed without a clear mandate. Once the forces were committed General Powell's position was to remain until the mission was completed successfully, as shown above.

Major General Garrison, the commander of the task force, requested additional equipment including armor in an attempt to reduce the risk of casualties, but there was "no action taken on the request."⁴⁸ It is unclear if Major

General William Garrison or UN Special Representative Howe attended the NCA meetings in Washington, DC.⁴⁹ It is also unclear if their opinion was heard at that meeting. According to Bowden's book Black Hawk Down both men were eager to stay in Somalia and pursue Aideed.⁵⁰

The reason for their position was that the military operations in Somalia were proving successful. The task force conducted seven raids, and all of the military objectives were met during the seven operations, despite some casualties sustained during the seventh operation. It was apparent that General Powell, MG Garrison and UN Special Representative Howe wanted to remain committed to the Somalia mission. However, their advice did not impact the decision.

Utilizing that type of system could cause the military leadership problems in the training of its future officer corps.

Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili expressed his feelings to Congress: "Not only are we setting a standard by which this country will judge us but...that might begin to have an impact on our young (commanders who) have the sense that if they go into an operation, and despite their best efforts, suffer casualties, that someone's going to be looking over their shoulders. How tragic it would be if we did that because we would train a group of leaders whom, through their hesitancy, would begin to endanger people."⁵¹

In May 1994 in a hearing to Congress, questions asked of MG Garrison were "did you ask for armor, did the President sign your deployment order, when did your mission change, who knew you were to apprehend Aideed?"⁵² This type of questioning through hind-site is what General Shalikashvili addressed in his statement.

Casualties did not cause the withdrawal of US forces from Somalia. The overarching reason the Commander-in-Chief withdrew from Somalia was to ensure the perception that he was making the decision on his terms and not because of casualties. In order to portray a committed posture to the international community, more forces were deployed to Somalia for six months, which allowed the mission to be claimed a success. The President's decision was based on his civilian advisers' position. They wanted the international community and the American public to perceive that President Clinton made the decision on his own terms versus being forced to make a decision. The withdrawal date also appeased Congress, preventing funding from being cut to the operation.

The media influenced the President and Congress. The media capitalized on the fear of casualties. This gave the misleading perception to the President that casualties were a decisive point of the US. This is not the case; the American public was still in support of the operations, proven by the poll data. The senior military leaders remained supportive although their advice to the NCA was not followed. Once the forces were committed General Powell wanted to remain. The eighteen casualties did not impact his position.

In the case study of the military operation in Somalia, casualties were not the reason for withdrawal. However, shortly after the firefight in Somalia fear of casualties apparently changed military operations in Haiti. The senior military leaders and Congress attempted to prevent the outcome of the Somalia operation from taking place in Haiti. The issue was not casualties; instead that

Haiti was not a US national interest according to some members of Congress and a portion of the American public. This was why Somalia impacted the Haiti operation.

Chapter III Haiti

In September 1991, Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras, head of the Haitian military, executed a military coup in Haiti. Haiti is located two hundred and ninety miles off the coast of Florida and a population of seven million, which is just larger than the state of Maryland. From October 1991, to September 1994, the Organization of American States (OAS), the UN and the US tried various political means to re-establish Jean Bertrand Aristide as President of Haiti.⁵³ On October 11, 1993 the *USS Harlan County* was prevented from docking at Port-au-Prince, Haiti. The Haitian mob at the port shouted that this would become another Somalia, so the decision was made to withdraw the vessel.⁵⁴

President Clinton's original position was to restore the Haitian government and let the refugees from Haiti remain in the US. A year later, in June, 1994 President Clinton's policy was to repatriate the fleeing Haitians. The problems in Haiti began to worsen. By March, 1994 seventy Haitians had been killed by the military. Three supporters of Aristide, exiled in the Florida, were also killed. The governor of Florida then sued the federal government for reimbursement of expenses spent on Haitian illegal immigrants.⁵⁵

In addition to negotiations the threat of US military action was required to remove General Cedras from power. President Clinton again had to decide whether to commit or withdraw US forces. This decision came only seven days after his decision to end the Somalia operation. President Clinton chose to commit the force. Then, while in flight to the area of operation, the force was turned around before actual combat operations began.

The President's reasons for commitment of US forces into Haiti were in support of US national interests. These interests included Haiti's proximity to the US, the stability of the region, the interests of Haitian Americans living in the US, and the threat to the welfare of US citizens living in Haiti.⁵⁶

The American public and Congress did not support the commitment of US forces to Haiti. They did not agree with President Clinton and his reasons for committing US forces to Haiti. Nevertheless, the President committed US forces.

The Chronology May – August, 1994

Despite diplomatic pressure and economic embargoes, Lieutenant General Cedras refused to reinstate President Aristide, while he intensified his reign of terror. In June the refugee processing station at Guantanamo Bay was reopened. President Clinton tightened economic sanctions against Haiti. Additionally, one hundred and fifty refugees drowned in an accident en-route to Florida.⁵⁷ Due to the poor economic situation in Haiti more "boat people" were fleeing to the US. Congressional leaders and Administration officials negotiated an amendment to the FY1994 Defense Appropriations Act that expressed that no funds would be obligated or be expended for US Military operations in Haiti

unless the operations were either; (1) authorized in advance by Congress, (2) necessary to protect or evacuate US citizens, (3) vital to the national security and there was not sufficient time to receive congressional authorizations, or (4) the President submitted a report in advance that the intended commitment met certain criteria.⁵⁸ Others, such as Senators John Kerry, Bob Graham, and Connie Mack, put forward arguments in favor of military intervention, emphasizing that sanctions have been ineffective on the Haitian military, but damaging to the poorest of the Haitian population.⁵⁹

In July International human rights observers were expelled from the country. On July 31, 1994 President Clinton pushed a resolution authorizing force to remove Cedras Junta from power and gained approval from the UN to invade Haiti.⁶⁰ Press reports stated "National Security Council advisors are the most supportive of intervention, while the Pentagon remained skeptical."⁶¹

After many debates, the Senate tabled an amendment that would have mandated congressional approval before invading Haiti. But there were a few issues involving Haiti that Congress did agree on. One issue that had mutual support from both Congress and the President was to stop the flow of refugees into the US.⁶²

In an attempt to address the refugee issue without the commitment of a military operation, Congress formulated six diplomatic options. Option one was a fact-finding commission to examine the situation in Haiti and formulate policy options. The second option was to disengage from Haiti's political crisis. The third option called for new elections in Haiti. The fourth option implemented a

new coalition government formed by Aristide. The fifth option offered a golden parachute retirement for Haiti's military leaders. The sixth and final option increased sanctions.⁶³ Most of these options seemed to make the cure worse than the disease. Congress could not agree on what to do with Haiti.

September 1 - 7, 1994

The first days of September, 1994 plans to invade Haiti were reviewed at the White House.⁶⁴ It is unclear who was in attendance at this meeting. It at least included the President, secretary of defense, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At this meeting, the military recommended four courses of action to the NCA. First, use of US-trained Haitian personnel to restore power. This course of action was a way to avoid US military casualties and to obviate the need for direct international participation, political or military. The second course of action was a demonstration of force. The intent of this COA was deterrence. If needed, air strikes would be conducted at symbolic targets, which would aide in persuading Haiti's leaders to step down. The intelligence community assessed the threat of Haitian air defense as low, so the risk to both US pilots and civilians would be minimal, particularly if prior warning was given to reduce the possibility of civil casualties. The third COA was limited military intervention. The intent was to limit the forces committed, and to invoke the Governor's Island Accord, adding some legal legitimacy to the operation. The use of a smaller force, however, raised the possibility of increased US casualties and a lengthier period of combat if resistance is encountered. The fourth and final COA was large-scale military intervention. Whether unilateral or multilateral, a larger-scale invasion of

Haiti promised to end organized resistance quickly and would likely keep the invasion force casualties to a minimum.⁶⁵

All the courses of action recommended by the military focused on the prevention of casualties, both Haitian and US. Senior DOD advisors remained concerned. After the White House meeting, Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutsch felt "the first few days may be easy, but I'm afraid we might get three or four boys hacked up in a few months."⁶⁶

The Republicans, led by combat veterans Senators Bob Dole and John McCain, argued that returning Aristide to Haiti wasn't worth a single American life. Their position was that President Clinton was ordering the invasion not to protect national security, but to appease his constituencies.⁶⁷ Congress did not believe nor support the President's reason for committing US forces to Haiti. Only twenty-four percent of Democrats were in favor of the operation.⁶⁸

The editorials of several newspapers showed the public was opposed to the intervention.⁶⁹ Polling from August through September, 1994 showed American people were moved more by altruism than self-interest.⁷⁰ Earlier the media had determined that the issue of casualties, either military or civilian, could be the subject of their reports. When the military mission changed from a forced entry operation to a peacekeeping mission, the casualty rate in Haiti was low. The theme of casualties could no longer be used to sell the story. Instead their theme became the reasons or policy to commit US forces to Haiti.

From August through September, 1994 the American public was polled to determine if they supported the commitment of US forces to Haiti. The public did

not believe that the US had a vital interest at stake. Due to his position the President's approval level was low.⁷¹

At this point in the process, Stephanopoulos reported that "by September there was no turning back." According to him, the President believed military intervention was morally justified. The National Command Authorities held a meeting on September 7th at the White House to review the war plans. The attendees were referred to as his national security team. General John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, briefed the proposed operation. At its conclusion, President Clinton thanked the Chairman and without hedging or hesitation commanded, "It's a good plan; let's go." The remainder of the meeting was spent developing a plan for how President Clinton could convince the Congress and the American public that invading Haiti was the right thing to do.⁷²

September 12 - 14, 1994

During the night of the 12, those members of Congress who did not support the commitment of US forces in Haiti placed numerous phone calls to the President, hoping to deter the invasion.⁷³ Stephanopoulos reported that on September 13, Pat Griffin, Leon Panetta and he entered the Oval Office to brief President Clinton. President Clinton said, "I guess we'll have something to show those people who say I never do anything unpopular" in reference to Haiti.⁷⁴

That evening the mission commander, Admiral Paul Miller, telephoned the White House and said "we need to get a couple of people flying wing on the Hill for us."⁷⁵ The military was going to conduct the operation, but military commanders did not believe in it. The senior leaders of the military also knew

Congress and the public didn't support the Haiti operation. Admiral Miller knew the reaction on Capitol Hill could be non-support, and that the result may be to cut funding for this operation. If Congress were kept abreast of the situation the backlash would be minimal.⁷⁶

Gallop Poll data showed that forty percent of those Americans polled favored committing troops while forty-eight percent favored not committing forces. When asked if the US had interests in Haiti forty-four percent agreed, while fifty-one percent disagreed.⁷⁷ The American public was not prepared to risk the lives of US troops in a situation where they felt there was no threat to US national interests.⁷⁸

September 15 & 16, 1994

On the evening of the 15th, President Clinton addressed the nation, informing them he was directing the Secretary of Defense to call up military reservists to support US troops in any action that might be taken in Haiti. During his speech President Clinton announced that the US would invade Haiti.⁷⁹ In explaining his actions, the President declared that beyond the human rights violations, the immigration problems, and the importance of democracy, the United States also has strong interests in not allowing dictators, especially those in our own geographic region, to break their word to the UN. The same people polled earlier by Gallop were called after the President's speech on September 15, 1994 for their reactions. Approval ratings again increased, by forty-three percent, in support of intervention as part of a multinational coalition.⁸⁰ President Clinton notified his subordinate military commanders on the 16th that he had decided to

implement the Haiti operation. The execution of the mission was scheduled for the morning of the 19th.⁸¹

Again, Congress was divided on the commitment of US forces into Haiti. Eighty-three percent of Republicans spoke in opposition, while seventeen percent offered no opinion. The Democrats voiced twenty-four percent in favor, thirty percent opposed and forty-six percent with no opinion.⁸² The War Powers Resolution requires consultation with Congress in every possible instance. Congress employed it now as many members complained that Congress had neither authorized, nor been consulted, on the anticipated decision to invade Haiti.

Other members of Congress opposed the commitment of forces for other reasons. One reason was there was no threat to the US' vital national interest. A second was that the President had gone to the UN and gained approval before asking it of the US Congress.⁸³ Additionally, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Jesse Helms prodded the Central Intelligence Agency to announce that Aristide was psychologically unstable, drug addicted and prone to violence.⁸⁴

Those members of Congress supporting the commitment of US forces to Haiti did so for many reasons. Some members of Congress supported the operation because their delegates and groups such as the Congressional Black caucus favored it.⁸⁵

September 17, 1994

The Carter delegation, which included President Carter, retired General Powell and Senator Sam Nunn, went to Haiti to try and reach a peaceful agreement for the Junta to relinquish power.⁸⁶ The talks did have a noon deadline, by two p.m. Carter's team had not completed negotiating. President Clinton had to make a decision. Should the 82nd Airborne Division pack their parachutes for the invasion? "Pack'em," the President ordered.⁸⁷ The operation was on schedule and the 82nd Airborne Division was going to conduct a forced entry mission into Haiti. Stephanopoulos reported that the President stated that they've agreed to leave, but we did not have a date. The President's advisers recommended continuing with the forced entry operation, unless the Carter team delivered a date. The forces conducting the operation in Haiti were airborne, enroute to Haiti, which allowed the President time to terminate the commitment prior combat operations. Around five o'clock President Clinton and Powell had a phone conversation during which they discussed a withdrawal date for the military leadership in Haiti. The Haitian military leaders had agreed to relinquish power. US military forces with a forced entry mission were recalled and returned to the United States.⁸⁸ Immediately, a peacekeeping force conducted operations in Haiti.

The news of the peacekeeping in Haiti hit the networks. Most of the support came after the number of casualties was released, both military and civilian, and the numbers were very low.⁸⁹ The American public rallied behind the President because of the success of the bloodless operation.⁹⁰ The media now focused on

two issues: first, refugees fleeing Haiti and secondly, the initial lack of support from the American public and Congress to back the policies or reasons for commitment of US forces. Welsh states "we in the media are too cynical and have lost touch in some important ways with our readers, viewers, and listeners. I have to look for an angle and an angle, by definition is subjective. The angle is almost always critical."⁹¹

As seen so far in the Haiti operation, casualties were not on the minds of the decision-makers. President Clinton, without support from Congress and the American public, committed US forces to Haiti. Congress and the American public felt the military operation into Haiti was not in pursuit of the protection of a national interest, and the President was doing this for his own political standing. After there were not casualties the media described a division between the President and Congress, in which the American public took the side of Congress.

Analysis

The President knew he did not have the support of Congress nor the American public. It was not even close. President Clinton's advisers even recommended having the State Department draft a "white paper", which would make a case for unilateral presidential action. The administration reviewed their polling data. The President's overall approval rating was the lowest it had ever been. The President was not working with a Congress whose position on military action in Haiti was split.

Casualties did not impact the NCA's decision to commit US forces to Haiti. President Clinton spoke of casualties on occasion but it never dominated the

headlines. The President was consumed with the image of the US in the eyes of the UN, and showed his skeptics that he was not afraid of taking a stand alone during crises.⁹² Congress did not support the commitment because it felt the policy was unclear. The courses of action recommended by Congress all involved non-military options. Congress did not ignore casualties, but they were not the sole reason for not supporting the commitment of US forces to Haiti.

The American public that opposed the intervention did so because there was no US interest at risk. This group of Americans also supported the Congress who felt that a democracy could not successfully be imposed on another sovereign country. Their decision did not focus on casualties but the policy that Haiti was a national interest.

In his book On War published in 1832 Carl Von Clausewitz stated,

No major proposal required for war can be worked out in ignorance of political factors; and when people talk, as they often do, about harmful political influence on the management of war, they are not really saying what they mean. Their quarrel should be with the policy itself, not with its influence. If the policy is right that is, successful any intentional effect it has on the conduct of the war can only be to the good. If it has the opposite effect the policy itself is wrong.⁹³

The Americans in support of the commitment of US forces cited that the incidence of 3,000 refugees per day was reason enough to intervene.

Supporters of the commitment cited that restoring democracy to a country that had had it stolen was also significant reason enough.

Senior military leaders and commanders considered the military mission, UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, as the worst course of action to take in solving the

problem with Haiti. The military recommended at least four courses of action, all of which attempted to reduce US and Haitian civilian casualties. These COAs were developed to prevent casualties, in order to sell the commitment to the American public and Congress. The military also had the reminder of Somalia in the forefront of their minds.

The media initially angled their stories to portray an operation that might be prolonged. They described the government of Haiti to the American people as brutality reincarnated. In order to keep the public watching and purchasing newspapers; the theme had to grab the reader. If the reader is not interested, then the networks and newspaper lose money because the public is not purchasing the material. In the end, casualties were not the focus of the media.

The issue of casualties did not influence the decision to commit US forces to the military operation, UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, in Haiti. The atrocities that took place in Kosovo reached such a magnitude that the US and NATO had to act. Countries other than the US did not want nor were they willing to commit ground forces to Kosovo.

Chapter IV Kosovo

In terms of this monograph the commitment of US forces to Kosovo will only be in reference the ground forces and not the air operation. The Dayton Accords in November, 1995 did not bring the Albanians of Kosovo peace. Instead they were alone and without assistance and still not treated humanly. Between 1995

and 1997 the Serb government used direct military action to deal with the Albanians in Kosovo. In 1997 a paramilitary organization named the Kosovo Liberation Army emerged.⁹⁴

The Chronology May 1998

The North Atlantic Council, NATO's governing body, directed an accelerated assessment of a full range of options for the situation in order to stop the atrocities and stabilize the country. The goal was to halt or disrupt the systematic campaign of violent repression in Kosovo. The first option was to stabilize the borders through preventive deployments in Albania and the Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia. The second option was to establish a no fly and no tank zone in Kosovo and to enforce it using NATO air forces. The third option was direct military intervention either through air strikes or ground forces deployment. The final option was peacekeeping deployments in the event of a political resolution.⁹⁵ These options allowed the NATO-led countries to assess what possible in the realm of conducting operations.

March 22 - 27, 1999

On Fox television on March 22nd Senator Joseph Biden said, "by the time the snows fall next winter, there will be genocide documented on a large scale in Kosovo." Retired Senator Bob Dole on *Meet the Press*, also in March, said "it's time for action, otherwise Milosevic is going to amass more troops and you're going to have another massacre. I think that is why we, the US, should

intervene."⁹⁶ US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, March 23, 1999 on CNN said,

we've learned that – over the 20th century – that instability in Europe, and fighting and ethnic conflicts has, in fact, brought the Americans in, American soldiers twice at a great cost, and that we have an opportunity to do something now, to stop massacre and fighting before it spreads beyond the national boundaries.⁹⁷

On March 24, 1999 President Clinton spoke to the American public from the White House, and said "I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war."⁹⁸ According to a senior Presidential adviser, shortly before NATO's 50th birthday, President Clinton decided he would send in US troops only if the air operation failed and that invasion was the only way to win the war.⁹⁹

April – May 1999

During the middle of April, General Wesley Clark, the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, called together British and US officers at NATO headquarters to poll their views on various ground force options. General Clark needed to know from his planners what was feasible. President Clinton had now decided he would commit ground forces if that were necessary to win the war.¹⁰⁰ The President urged British Prime Minister Tony Blair to stop talking publicly about the invasion because it caused domestic problems for the allies.¹⁰¹ President Clinton was concerned about keeping the coalition intact. This was the first attempt at coalition warfare by NATO alliance that acted on the basis of consensus and, in this instance at least, imposed extraordinary demand on commanders to minimize casualties among pilots and innocent civilians.¹⁰² By the middle of May, General Clark had come up with a preliminary plan, which

called for a ground attack from the south. General Clark went to Washington hoping to get approval from the President. The President wanted to put off his decision as long as possible.¹⁰³ On May, 19 General Clark briefed the Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry H. Shelton, in the Pentagon and was given guidance to work the issue some more. Secretary Cohen and General Shelton adamantly opposed the commitment of US ground forces into Kosovo.¹⁰⁴

Secretary Cohen addressed his apprehension with the President in May. On the morning of May 27, Secretary Cohen had flown to Bonn to secretly discuss a possible NATO invasion of Yugoslavia. The meeting in Bonn lasted six hours, after which Secretary Cohen saw clearly that a consensus for ground forces was not going to materialize. "I argued for intensifying the air war and for streamlining and broadening the target selection process."¹⁰⁵ Keeping the coalition united was the overriding reason the use of ground forces was not approved.

Some members of Congress concluded the US could force the Yugoslavian government to agree to an acceptable Kosovo settlement, including the return of refugees. These members felt that if a creditable force was threatened or applied, in particular the use of ground forces, the Yugoslavian government would accept the settlement. Some members of Congress felt that if the US did not support the operation, NATO's survival may be at stake.¹⁰⁶ Senator John McCain and House Intelligence Committee Chairman Porter J. Goss supported the air operation.¹⁰⁷ Senator Mitch McConnell, Joseph I. Lieberman and Eliot L. Engel, co-chairman of the Albanian Issues Caucus introduced a resolution to

provide aide to the KLA if NATO and the US were not looking to put ground troops into Kosovo.¹⁰⁸ Other Members of Congress not supporting the commitment of forces cited examples of past interventions as the reason for the objection, particularly Iraq, where air power alone would not have achieved the objectives.¹⁰⁹

June - July 1999

At twelve o'clock on June 2nd, Samuel "Sandy" Berger, the President's National Security Adviser, met with several foreign policy experts who publicly supported the use of ground forces in Kosovo. In attendance were former National Security Council staff member Ivo Daalder, former NATO commander George Joulwan, and former US ambassador to the UN Jeane J. Kirkpatrick.¹¹⁰ With the outcome of the air campaign in doubt, Secretary Cohen and the Joint Chiefs of Staff announced they would be meeting with President Clinton to discuss the possibility of an eventual ground attack.¹¹¹

Polling since April, 1999 by the Pew Research Center found sixty percent of Americans were very worried about American combat casualties, although to date there had not been any. The data also showed that even after bombing mistakes killed scores of civilians, just forty percent of those Americans polled were very worried about civilian casualties.¹¹² The atrocities increased and NATO estimated that Serbian forces killed at least ten thousand, mostly unarmed civilian Kosovar Albanians once the air strike began.¹¹³ On June 10, President Clinton spoke to the nation and stated,

I want to express my profound gratitude to the men and women of our armed forces and those of our allies. Day after day, night

after night, they flew, risking their lives to attack their targets and to avoid civilian casualties when they were fired upon from populated areas. We are grateful that during NATO's air campaign, we did not lose a single serviceman in combat. But this next phase will be dangerous. Bitter memories will still be fresh, and there may well be casualties.¹¹⁴

He warned the American public about the possibility of casualties.

Elizabeth Farnsworth conducted an interview with four retired military officers, General Merrill McPeak, General Richard Neal, Lieutenant General Robert Gard, and Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Peters, on the *News Hour with Jim Lehrer*, on June 16, 1999. Farnsworth asked if air power alone could win a war. McPeak said, "maybe not precisely, because a lot of instruments of national power were brought to bear." Peters responded with "we fought this with air power essentially a high-tech version of World War II. After three months we have inflicted very little destruction on the Serb army." Neal inserted, "we sent our military there as a one-arm puncher. There is a lot of ethnic cleansing that took place beneath the air campaign." The next question posed to the panel was "could the lesson be drawn that it's possible to fight a war without American combat casualties and if so what is the consequence?" Neal responded, "I'm really concerned about that, obviously we don't want any casualties but to make those as actual criteria on how you conduct the fight, really limits the ability of the unified commander." Peters concurred with "I absolutely agree with Neal. We may be on the way to some very nasty knife-fight wars. I think the American public can handle it better than our leaders." Gard answered, "if we place our principle strategic priority on force protection at the expense of a greater risk of

innocent civilians, then the strategy we pursue corrupts its purpose." McPeak said. "I don't hear any airmen complaining about the fact we didn't lose pilots."¹¹⁵

The commitment of ground forces was inevitably followed by the question of casualties. This was displayed in the interviews conducted with four Americans on the *News Hour with Jim Lehrer*. This was a way of selling the papers, and it kept the ratings high.

General Clark was interviewed on the *News Hour with Jim Lehrer* on July 1, 1999. Margaret Warner conducted the interview and one of the issues was about casualties. When Warner addressed another very controversial point, "was there emphasis on no American casualties," General Clark responded. "With all of this talk about avoiding American casualties, most of it came from the press. I never got any guidance in that respect. In fact, Secretary Cohen and many others were very clear that this was a high-risk operation and we would likely have losses. What air campaign, what military operation do you ever know where we've sought casualties."¹¹⁶ Warner continued, "there is a sort of assumption American public and European public could not stand a long and bloody war. Do you think the American public is that squeamish, that unwilling to sacrifice?" General Clark's response was "as the horrors unfolded there was a surge in resolution and determination in both Europe and the US." The final question was "in future wars, the political leadership shouldn't assume that Americans are unwilling to take casualties?" General Clark answered with "I think that will depend very much on the circumstances, the objectives and the whole nature of the conflict."¹¹⁷

General Clark testified in early July that there was no way the alliance could have held together if planners had started out with a full bombing campaign and all the necessary staging for ground forces. "It just wasn't going to be possible."¹¹⁸ The alliance was not at that time prepared to make that commitment. Some members of Congress believed the US should not commit such substantial force to an area of limited US interests, and argued the US should seek to exit as quickly as possible. The House voted for requiring congressional approval for the use of ground forces. The Congress was deadlocked on a vote authorizing US involvement in the air war despite on-going missions. They were concerned about the impact of the air campaign on overall military readiness and whether there has been an equitable distribution of costs among the NATO allies.¹¹⁹

Yet another section of Congress believed if the US withdrew it would be interpreted by the international community as defeat, and would leave the perception that the US is unwilling to use its substantial power in pursuit of its goals. They then doubled the emergency supplemental appropriation that the Clinton Administration had requested to conduct the war.¹²⁰ This situation could also contribute to a perception the US is unwilling or unable to exercise leadership. Such an exit would perpetuate a vicious cycle where opponents feel increasingly confident in challenging the US, requiring that the US use greater force in the future to make its threats credible.

Analysis

Human rights were the reason NATO responded to the Kosovo crisis. In the review of the data in the Kosovo operation the overarching issue was maintaining the unity of the NATO coalition. That is why ground forces were not committed. Casualties have not been the overriding issue with the exception of the US' DoD. As shown above the Secretary of Defense and Chairman did not want to commit ground forces into Kosovo because of casualties.

The National Command Authorities were split over the commitment of ground forces to Kosovo. As stated above, President Clinton addressed the American public, informing them he was not going to commit US forces to a war. Yet within a few weeks, a plan(s) for deploying ground forces was being developed. Secretary Cohen conveyed apprehension to President Clinton and reiterated his reluctance to send in ground troops. At the meeting held in Germany, Secretary Cohen attempted to get support for a ground invasion, but as he stated when there, seemed to be non-support, so he personally pushed to intensify the air campaign. The National Command Authorities would have committed ground forces regardless of casualties but NATO did not support this course of action.

DoD defined the mission as attacking the Yugoslav military infrastructure with the objectives of deterring future attacks on Albanian Kosovars and degrading the ability of Yugoslav forces to carry out these operations. A strong concern over minimal risk to NATO pilots dictated a high ceiling for the aircraft to engage targets. The desire to avoid any collateral civilian casualties (Serb or Albanian) also hampered targeting objectives.¹²¹

There was a concern about casualties from the coalition. Officials said massive pilot casualties would weaken the will of decision-makers in NATO countries.¹²² The American public was concerned with the issue of American casualties. The poll data showed the public was worried about American casualties, but not Albanians or Serbs. This point was again proven when the atrocities continued during the air campaign, yet the American public did not pressure to invade or commit US ground forces.

The majority of Congress was in support of the commitment of US forces into Kosovo. There were some members of Congress who did not support the operation because, they believed it would weaken US forces. Ultimately, the Congress approved emergency money for the war, and was going to give monies to the KLA.

The media portrayed that casualties were causing the decision-makers not to commit US ground forces into Kosovo.¹²³ One of the major themes was whether the air campaign could win the war, and if not, was Kosovo reason enough to deploy US ground forces. This topic was asked of numerous persons and the responses were split. What the media did not know, or need to know, was that President Clinton was willing to commit US ground forces to Kosovo.

The military was divided on the issue of commitment of US ground forces into Kosovo. The NATO commander did not let casualties prevent him from supporting the commitment of US ground forces into Kosovo. In his interview with Margaret Warner, General Clark said he received no guidance about keeping the casualty rate down. Casualties would not have prevented General

Clark from recommending that President Clinton commit ground forces. "NATO's coalition, if asked to contemplate such a possibility, would cause the alliance to splinter," according to General Clark.¹²⁴

General Shelton was opposed to the commitment of US ground forces into Kosovo. LTG Short's position was there were limitations placed on the military and it looked an awful lot like casualties.

Chapter V Conclusion

During the 1990s casualties have not been the overarching reason for decision-makers to either commit or withdraw US forces from military operations. In the Somalia operation, the National Command Authorities were concerned with the image of the United States in the eye of the international community supporting the United Nations. This is the reason President Clinton made the withdrawal date March 31, 1994, six months after the conclusion of the firefight. This date also pleased Congress, who was ready to cut funding to the operation because of what they felt were unclear aims. The American public and the military were committed to the Somalia operation even after the deaths of eighteen young soldiers. The media misleadingly portrayed the issue of casualties as the sole reason for withdrawal. In the case of Somalia, casualties were not the reason for withdrawal.

The issue of casualties was not addressed and never influenced the Commander-In-Chief's decision in Haiti. The Congress and the American public

were concerned with the reason behind the commitment of US forces into Haiti but not casualties; believing that the US should not invade Haiti because it was not in support of a vital US national interest. The military, on the other hand, was very concerned with casualties, as proven by the four courses of action recommended to the National Command Authorities, each one an attempt to reduce casualties. The media's angle portrayed a military operation that could escalate to a long-term commitment of US forces, but with no mention of casualties.

In the case of Kosovo, casualties did not influence the decision of President Clinton. In his public address, the President stated he would not commit US forces in order to fight a war in Kosovo. Within a few weeks President Clinton was willing to commit ground forces into Kosovo in order to win the war. Secretary Cohen did not want to commit ground forces but his exact reason for this is unclear. The majority of Congress was in support of committing ground forces into Kosovo. The American public was concerned about casualties but this did not negate their support for ground forces. Military commanders were overly concerned about casualties, but the constraints placed on them made it seem that senior leaders were concerned about casualties. The media was attempting to get the true story because it was only allowed to report from far away. They played up the atrocities and the issue of American casualties.

In Somalia, Haiti, and Kosovo, casualties had very little impact on the decision-makers to commit or withdraw US forces. The reason for commitment

or withdrawal was not casualties but the image of the US in the international community.

The importance or the so what of this monograph for the operational commander and planner is casualties impact the NCA and Congress more than the American public. The media uses casualties to inform the public, which will cause the public to purchase the newspapers creating business for the industry. In doing so casualties shine a very negative light on that administration especially if the military objectives are not tied to a political aim and nested with a national interest. If these objectives and aims are not nested then the likelihood of Congress cutting funding is great. The operational commander must give the NCA recommendation that take all this into account. The operational commander must ensure he or she understands this complex system in order to provide options to the Commander-in-Chief.

The decision-makers make decisions for the good for the United States, the international community, and for the long-term. As the only superpower and arguably the world's police force, casualties are and will continue to be an issue the US must address. However, the US should not allow casualties to prevent the commitment of US forces when it serves an appropriate higher purpose.

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¹ As defined in Joint Publication 1-02 deployment means "the relocation of forces and materiel to desired areas of operations. Deployment encompasses all activities from origin or home station through destination, specifically including intra-continental United States, intertheater, and intratheater movement legs, staging, and holding areas." Joint Publications does not define the term "committed" however Department of the Army, FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics does. As defined in FM 101-5-1 committed force means "a force in contact with an enemy or deployed on a specific mission or course of action, which precludes its employment elsewhere." Finally, Joint Publication 1-02 defines "withdrawal operations" as a planned operation in which a force in contact disengages from an enemy force.

² Benjamin Schwarz., United States Army. United States Air Force. Rand Corporation. Arroyo Center. "Casualties, public opinion, and U.S. military intervention: implications for U.S. regional deterrence strategies." (California: Rand, 1994), 20. This is a book that looks at the American public in an attempt to determine what the public's opinion is toward the issue of casualties. The case studies are Korea, Vietnam, Gulf War and Somalia. It is important to understand the data that supports the findings of the polls. The polls use specific questions and only the answer to those questions are published. The public taking the poll is not allowed to elaborate about the issue, just allowed to answer the question. The end product is just a snap shot of the opinions of a few Americans across a narrow portion of the issue.

³ George Stephanopoulos., All Too Human: A Political Education. (Boston and New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1999), 214. George Stephanopoulos, the President's senior adviser, attempts to take an objective look at Clinton Administration while working at The White House from 1991 – 1996. He brings out the point that the polls were used to monitor the views of the American public during the Haiti operation. See pages 210 – 216 for Somalia and 217 – 219 & 305 – 315 for Haiti. There is no mention of polls during the Somalia decision to withdraw. There is also now mention of the hostage, Michael Durant, during the two-day decision process.

⁴ Don Oberdorfer, "*The Path to Intervention: A Massive Tragedy 'We Could Do Something About,'*" The Washington Post, December 6, 1992, A1.

⁵ Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar., Somalia State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction. (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 33-34. This book addresses the operational level in enough detail to insure the causes and affects of actions are clearly understood.

⁶ Mark Bowden., Black Hawk Down. (New York, NY: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999), 71. Black Hawk Down is a book about an engagement of an elite American force with the Somali people on the 3rd and 4th of October 1993. This book is excellent at the tactical level because it covers the firefight in detail. The book also plays on the heart of the reader because the feelings of the soldiers and their families are portrayed. The one thing this book does not do very well is addressing the issues at the operational and strategic levels. This engagement can also be found in Lyons' and Samatar's book on page 57 – 58.

⁷ Lyons and Samatar, 57.

⁸ Keith B. Richburg, "*US Somalia Envoy Urged Policy Shift before 18 GIs Died,*" The Washington Post, November 11, 1993 A39.

⁹ Committee on Armed Service., "*Hearing before the Committee and Armed Services United States Senate One Hundred Third Congress second session.*" (Washington D.C.: US Government printing office, 1994), 44. This document clearly demonstrates that in order to develop guidance and a course of action; one must have a clear understanding of the problem set.

¹⁰ Howard Kurtz, "No American Journalists Reporting From the Scene," The Washington Post, October 6, 1993, A12.

¹¹ Stephanaopoulos, 214.

¹² Ibid., 214.

¹³ Bowden, 322.

¹⁴ Tom Kenworthy and John Lancaster, "At Least 5 Americans Killed in Somali Attack," The Washington Post, October 4, 1993. A1.

¹⁵ Ann Devroy, "Somalia Options Reviewed as Discontent in Congress Grows, New Deployment Raises Confusion on U.S. Goals," The Washington Post, October 6, 1993, A1. This article covers events on October 5, 1993.

¹⁶ Bowden, 322.

¹⁷ Helen Dewar and Kevin Merida, "From Congress, More Questions," The Washington Post, October 5, 1993, A25.

¹⁸ Lyons and Samatar, 59.

¹⁹ Ann Devroy and John Lancaster, "Clinton to Add 1,500 Troops in Somalia, Considers a March 31 Withdrawal Date," The Washington Post, October 7, 1993. A1

²⁰ Rick Atkinson, "Deliverance From Warlord's Fury," The Washington Post, October 7, 1993, A1.

²¹ Kurtz, A12.

²² Kenneth T. Walsh, Feeding the Beast the White House versus the Press. (New York, Random House, 1996), 238. See pages 153 – 154 for Somalia and 289 for Haiti.

²³ Lyons and Samatar, 33. General Powell's initial position of not supporting the Somalia operation is also stated in the Committee on Armed Services report on page 43.

²⁴ Associated Press released President Clinton's address to the American Public in The Washington Post. October 8, 1993, A21. President Clinton quoting General Powell.

²⁵ Devroy and Lancaster, A1.

²⁶ Walsh, 153.

²⁷ Associated Press released President Clinton's address to the American Public in The Washington Post. October 8, 1993, A21. The information contained in the President's speech was public knowledge on October 5, 1993.

²⁸ Devroy, A1.

²⁹ Kurtz, A12.

³⁰ Bowden, 311.

³¹ Devroy and Lancaster, A1.

³² Devroy, A1.

³³ Devroy and Lancaster, A1.

³⁴ Associated Press released President Clinton's address to the American Public in The Washington Post. October 8, 1993, A21.

³⁵ Sidney Bumenthal, "Why Are We in Somalia?" New Yorker, October 25, 1993, 49-60, provides an insightful account of the reaction in Washington DC to the 3rd & 4th of October 1993 firefight in Somalia.

³⁶ Devroy and Lancaster, A1.

³⁷ Stephanopoulos, 215.

³⁸ Ibid., 216.

³⁹ Ibid., 215.

⁴⁰ Nina M. Serafino, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, *Military Intervention by U.S. Forces from Vietnam to Bosnia: Background, Outcomes, and "Lessons Learned"* for Kosovo, Library of Congress, May 20, 1999, 20.

⁴¹ Schwarz, 24.

⁴² Ibid., 24.

⁴³ Walsh, cover sheet.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 289.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 291 – 294.

⁴⁶ Bowden, 322.

⁴⁷ Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, "A Look At...Casualty Aversion", The Washington Post. November 7, 1999, B3.

⁴⁸ Committee on Armed Service, 59.

⁴⁹ The location of MG Garrison and Special Representative Howe is unclear during NCA's meeting after the firefight in Somalia. These two men's position was to remain committed in Somalia. It is important to determine if their opinion was heard during the meetings at the White House. In Black Hawk Down Bowden portrays they are in the meeting at the White House. The many newspaper articles, Congressional records and books by retired General Powell, Stephanopoulos and Walsh do not state if they were present.

⁵⁰ Bowden, 311.

⁵¹ Michael W. Alvis, "Dying for Peace: Understanding the role of Casualties in U.S. peace operations." U.S. Naval War College Research Paper, 1 June 1998, 18. This paper attempts to address the issue of casualties during peace operations. The paper does not ask the question did casualties impact the decision-makers, which will get at the root of the issue of casualties.

⁵² Committee on Armed Service, 44 – 48.

⁵³ Maureen Taft-Morales and Steven R. Bowman. "*Haiti's Political Crisis: U.S. Policy Options.*" Congressional Research Service Report for Congress. The Library of Congress, 14 July 1994, 2.

⁵⁴ After researching the *USS Harlan County* incident it is unclear who made the decision to withdraw the vessel. The ship commander made the decision to depart and at some level of command, even at the White House agreed after a day of dialog. In his book Stephanopoulos implies that Tony Lake the National Security Adviser, Aspin, Christopher and David Gergen who was part of the foreign policy team made the decision. He also implies that President Clinton did not make the decision.

⁵⁵ Julie J. O'Neal, "*U.S. Intervention in Grenada, Panama, and Haiti: A Social Construction Perspective.*" Naval Postgraduate School, December 1995. Page 131.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 93.

⁵⁷ O'Neal, 131.

⁵⁸ Taft-Morales, and Bowman, 6 – 7.

⁵⁹ Taft-Morales and Bowman, 17.

⁶⁰ Serafino, 23. This same data can be found in Stephanopoulos' book on page 305.

⁶¹ Taft-Morales and Bowman, 16.

⁶² Stephanopoulos, 10.

⁶³ Maureen Taft-Morales and Steven R. Bowman. "*Haiti's Political Crisis: U.S. Policy Options.*" Congressional Research Service Report for Congress. The Library of Congress, 14 July 1994, 9 - 15.

⁶⁴ Stephanopoulos, 306.

⁶⁵ Taft-Morales and Bowman, 20 – 21.

⁶⁶ Stephanopoulos, 305.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 307.

⁶⁸ O'Neal, 88 – 89. The polls were taken before September 19, 1994.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 86 – 87.

⁷⁰ Stephanopoulos, 309.

⁷¹ Taft-Morales, and Bowman, 86.

⁷² Stephanopoulos, 307.

⁷³ Ibid., 308.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 308.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 309.

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- ⁷⁶ Ibid., 309.
- ⁷⁷ O'Neil, 133 – 134.
- ⁷⁸ Ibid., 77.
- ⁷⁹ Stephanopoulos, 310.
- ⁸⁰ O'Neal, 86.
- ⁸¹ Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann and John T. Fishel, "Invasion, Intervention, 'Intervasion': A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy. (Fort Leavenworth, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press), 97 - 98.
- ⁸² O'Neal, 88 – 89.
- ⁸³ Serafino, 24.
- ⁸⁴ Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel, 55.
- ⁸⁵ Stephanopoulos, 307.
- ⁸⁶ O'Neal, 98.
- ⁸⁷ Stephanopoulos, 314.
- ⁸⁸ Ibid., 314 – 315.
- ⁸⁹ O'Neal, 82.
- ⁹⁰ Sixty-six percent of editorials spoke of support for the operations because there were no casualties due to hostile fire.
- ⁹¹ Walsh, 7 & 239.
- ⁹² Stephanopoulos, 218.
- ⁹³ Carl von Clausewitz, On War. Translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- ⁹⁴ Noel Malcolm, Kosovo A Short History. (New York, NY: New York University Press, 1998), 314 - 356.
- ⁹⁵ Steve Bowman, Congressional Research Service Issue Brief, *Kosovo: U.S. and Allied Military Operations*, Library of Congress, September 3, 1999, 1.
- ⁹⁶ Stratfor.com news 26 September 1999 [document on-line]; <http://www.stratfor.com/crisis/kosovo/genocidequotes.htm>; Internet; accessed 26 September 1999.
- ⁹⁷ Stratfor.com news 26 September 1999 [document on-line]; <http://www.stratfor.com/crisis/kosovo/genocidequotes.htm>; Internet; accessed 26 September 1999.
- ⁹⁸ Dana Priest, "*Kosovo Land Threat May Have Won War*," The Washington Post, 19 September 1999, A1.

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- ⁹⁹ Ibid., A1.
- ¹⁰⁰ Priest, A1.
- ¹⁰¹ Ibid., A1.
- ¹⁰² Bradley Graham, "Air Force, Army Battle for Lead in Future Wars," The Washington Post. 22 June 1999, A1.
- ¹⁰³ Ibid., A30.
- ¹⁰⁴ Priest, A1.
- ¹⁰⁵ Ibid., A1.
- ¹⁰⁶ Serafino, 8.
- ¹⁰⁷ Helen Dewar, "Kosovo Policy Further Strains Relations Between Clinton, Hill," The Washington Post. 27 March 1999, A5.
- ¹⁰⁸ Thomas W. Lippman, "NATO Unlikely to Step up Attack," The Washington Post. 26 March 1999, A1.
- ¹⁰⁹ Serafino, 7 – 8.
- ¹¹⁰ Lippman, A1.
- ¹¹¹ Associated Press, "Milosevic Had Intelligence He Would Face Ground Attack," The Washington Post. 1 September 1999, 7.
- ¹¹² Blaine Harden, "Crisis in the Balkans: News analysis; Surprising Lesson: Bombing can work," The New York Times, 5 June 1999, A6.
- ¹¹³ Michael O'Hanlon, "Saving Lives with Forces: How to stop genocide." The New Republic. 12 July 1999, 21 – 23.
- ¹¹⁴ Stratfor.com "Text of Clinton's address to the nation on Kosovo"; 23 September 1999 [document on-line]; <http://www.stratfor.com/crisis/kosovo/specialreports/special86.htm>; Internet; accessed 23 September 1999.
- ¹¹⁵ On line news hour 16 June 1999 [document on-line]; was from http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/europe/jan-june99/lessons_6-16.html; Internet; accessed 23 September 1999.
- ¹¹⁶ On line news hour 1 July 1999 [document on-line]; was from http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/europe/july-dec99/clark_7-1.html; Internet; accessed 23 September 1999.
- ¹¹⁷ Ibid., 6 - 7.
- ¹¹⁸ James Kitfield, "A War of Limits" Foreign Affairs sections, The National Journal, 24 July 1999, 2145.
- ¹¹⁹ Steve Bowman. "Kosovo: U.S. and Allied Military Operations." Congressional Research Service Report for Congress. The Library of Congress, 3 September 1999, 1.

¹²⁰ Kitfield, 2145.

¹²¹ Ibid., 2146

¹²² Graham, A1.

¹²³ On line news hour 16 June 1999 [document on-line]; was from http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/europe/jan-june99/lessons_6-16.html; Internet; accessed 23 September 1999.

¹²⁴ Priest, A1.